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Northern Ireland has been characterised as having an excessively large public sector. This characterisation has 
led some to explain poor regional economic performance in terms of ‘crowding out’. This diagnosis has been 
used to justify a policy of ‘rebalancing’ and the region copying its southern neighbour’s lower rate of 
corporation tax. However, Rodrik’s comparative institutional analysis indicates that - as in the Nordics – a large 
public sector was the result of building a successful tradable private sector. In terms of the possible ‘economic 
dividend’ from devolution it suggests that a Hayekian insight is better: no ‘silver bullets’ exist.   
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…it is the character rather than the volume of government activity that is important.   A functioning market 
economy presupposes certain activities on the part of the state; there are some other such activities by 
which its functioning will be assisted; and it can tolerate many more, provided that they are of the kind 
which are compatible with a functioning market. But there are those which run counter to the very principle 
on which a free system rests and which must therefore be altogether excluded if such a system is to work. In 
consequence, a government that is comparatively inactive but does the wrong things may do much more to 
cripple the forces of a market economy than one that is more concerned with economic affairs but confines 
itself to actions which assist the spontaneous forces of the economy (Hayek 1960,.222).  
Is it always the case though that a large public sector equates to a lack of economic competitiveness? Take 
somewhere like Sweden. 51.3% of its GDP is accounted for by public spending and nearly 40% of its 
people are employed in the public sector. Yet it ranks as the 5th most competitive economy on the planet 
and the most innovative. The same is true in places like Denmark, Finland and Singapore. Large public 
sectors and competitive economies aren’t mutually exclusive (Hamilton 2013). 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Hayek’s political, legal and economic thought all share a number of common themes 
underpinned by a commitment to a free society (Friedman, 1977; Dietze, 1977; Butler, 
1983; Vaughn, 1998). One clear theme that pervades Hayek’s thinking across disciplinary 
boundaries, and perhaps best exemplified by the range of topics covered in his 
Individualism and Economic Order, is that of the advantages of decentralisation in both 
political and economic life (Hayek, 1948). Equally, Hayek was critical throughout his 
work of the idea that since humans created institutions (such as law and moral codes) they 
could easily alter them to satisfy desires or wishes (Butler, 1983).  Likewise, another 
pervasive theme - of particular relevance to discussing rebalancing economies - concerns 
Hayek’s insight on the size and scope of the state. This was the topic raised in The Road 
to Serfdom developed in the The Constitution of Liberty and refined further in Law, 
Legislation and Liberty (Butler, 1983, p.121).  
While Hayek clearly favoured markets, due to their spontaneous ordering and 
discovery process features, he was no advocate of anarcho-capitalism; nor did he have 
much time for state monopolies (Hayek, 1982; Butler, 1983). Hayek thought was actually 
more nuanced than these ideological extremes: he instead argued that state intervention 
(with its attendant risk of government failure) could work under certain circumstances, 
but that the danger was that distortionary interventions - such as prices and wage controls 
– would harm the market process. Along these lines Hayek’s Road to Serfdom has been 
reinterpreted as providing a government failure framework applicable to both markets and 
constitutions (Hayek, 1944; Boettke, 1995). 
Hayek was particularly concerned that vested interests would hinder the market 
process; this led him to consider the possibility of creating a model constitution (Hayek, 
1982). Hayek’s discussion of a model constitution - as it was more concerned with more 
abstract issues concerning voting rights, constitutional courts and the failings of existing 
models - understandably gives very little concrete advice to fiscal aspects in the area of 
UK devolution. However, applying insights derived from both his earlier and later work 
provides clues. Hayek connected the issue of the size and scope of the state to the 
economics of political and fiscal decentralisation (Hayek, 1948, 1982).  
In the wake of the economic and financial crisis of 2007-8 there has been recent 
popular discussion of the appropriate role of the state within modern economies. Authors 
vary on the consequences of different public spending shares and the respective merits of 
allowing the state rather than the market to perform different functions. A range of issues, 
that relate to the optimal balance between the private and public sector, including models 
of public sector delivery, regional and industrial policies have been reassessed in response 
to challenging economic conditions (Moretti 2013; Mazzucato 2013; Micklethwait and 
Woolridge 2014). Rebalancing, as discussed in the UK coalition government’s 2010 
Programme for Government (and reiterated in subsequent Budgets and Autumn 
Statements), reflected the diagnosis that economic performance in the years prior to the 
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financial crisis had become too structurally and geographically  dependent on the London 
and South East-based financial sector.  Rebalancing, as outlined in Figure 1, thus involves 
a number of policy choices that all stem from trying to make the UK a less geographically 
and structurally skewed economy (Pike et al 2012).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
This ongoing debate on the merits of rebalancing, however it is defined, can be traced 
back to policy debates during the 1980s associated with the Thatcherite project of ‘rolling 
back the frontiers of the state’. An important line of argument that re-emerges in 
rebalancing debate, as well as arguably explaining the Conservative Party approach to 
public expenditure after 1979, is associated with Bacon and Eltis (1976). They explained 
deindustrialization in the UK as being due to it being displaced (‘crowded out’) by the 
excessive growth of the non-market public sector, much of which consisted of 
nationalised industries such as steel. The growth of the non-market public sector relative 
to market sector, according to Bacon and Eltis, promoted higher taxation, interest rates, 
deterred investment and reduced international competitiveness (Crafts 2012).  
However, economic historians (both sympathetic and unsympathetic to the economic 
reforms of the 1980s) have downplayed the relevance of the Bacon and Eltis mechanism 
in their analysis of the UK (Stafford, 1981; Crafts, 1993). It has been noted for instance 
that the rise in government-financed non-market sector consumption displaced market 
sector consumption rather than investment. Over time the number of workers paying 
income tax grew (Crafts, 1993, p.27). Furthermore, during the 1980s there was no decline 
in the relative size of the non-marketed sector, but the profit squeeze evaporated and the 
share of profits in value-added reverted back to 1960s levels (Crafts, 1993, p.27).1 
Hayekian qualifications to the original Bacon and Eltis (macroeconomic line of 
argument) would qualify the role of aggregation in the framework (Machlup, 1977).  
In this paper we are interested in the regional level of analysis and in particular the 
Northern Ireland (NI) context. NI is a small polity with longstanding relatively large 
government sector combined with weak economic performance - can be contrasted with 
the success of the Nordics.2 The Nordic countries (defined here as including Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark), as successful small open economies, have been able to 
reconcile large public sectors with good long-run economic performance. Table 1 
indicates the divergent living standard record of NI (and indeed the UK) relative to the 
Nordics: 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Moreover, efficient Nordic economic outcomes have been reconciled with a fair 
degree of social equity.3 Acemoglu and Robinson (2014) have indeed claimed that 
institutional factors go most of the way in explaining Sweden’s favourable egalitarian 
socio-economic outcomes. By extension, given the institutional analogies that will be 
demonstrated to exist amongst the Nordics, a similar assessment may arguably also apply 
to Denmark, Finland and Norway: in contrast, the history of Northern Irish political and 
economic institutions before the Troubles cannot be described as leading to egalitarian 
outcomes. The primary purpose of this article is to evaluate the claims that the Nordics 
provide a relevant economic-institutional model for NI to imitate or import.  
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Hence, for those particularly interested in the possible connections between 
government expenditure and economic activity, NI provides an interesting institutional-
economic ‘mirror’ in which to compare the Nordics against. ‘Big government’ has 
succeeded in the Nordics in a way that it has not in Northern Irish context. Political 
scientists have under a number of terms including ‘policy transfer’, considered the issue 
of the extent to which policies, institutions and concepts from one jurisdiction can be 
transplanted into another (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; 
Dolowitz and Medearis 2009).  The policy relevance and implications of comparison with 
Nordics have not escaped political and business figures within NI (Hamilton 2013, Birnie 
2014).  
A supplementary purpose of this article is to demonstrate that a comparative 
institutional analysis of NI relative to the Nordics also has more general implications for 
those searching for an elusive ‘economic dividend’ from devolution in the UK (Pike et al 
2012; Tomlinson 2014). Concerning the ‘economic dividend’ of devolution, devolution 
by itself has not led to an effective policy making. Indeed there has been some academic 
discussion about the willingness or ability of the devolved institutions to contribute to 
economic improvement (Murtagh and Shirlow 2012).  
In contrast, to the influential ‘crowding out’ thesis, the oft-misrepresented ideas of 
Friedrich Hayek on the economic role of the state should be considered. Hayek’s analysis 
has important implications for considering rebalancing in general and the more specific 
feasibility of transplanting the Nordic model elsewhere.4 In his Constitution of Liberty, 
Hayek argued that the vital issue was not the relative or absolute size of the public 
sector.5 The essence for Hayek was that appropriate interventions (and hence the balance 
between the private and public sector) should be based on following rules rather than 
discretion.6 Moreover, Hayek did not think the volume and structure of appropriate 
interventions would remain constant. Of particular relevance to contemporary debates on 
policy transfer and/or public service delivery, he argued that technical change would 
‘constantly suggest new ways in which government might render services to its citizens 
and bring such possibilities within the range of the practicable’ (Hayek 1960, p.231).  
However, while Hayek’s argument is more applicable than the Bacon and Eltis 
hypothesis, even it is incomplete. Gray argues perceptively that Hayek’s analysis does not 
go far enough in terms of considering the institutional environment in which public policy 
operates, as markets are ‘complex cultural institutions that are embedded in customs and 
traditions’ (Gray 1998, 155). Hence an apparently well-functioning ‘spontaneous’ market 
actually requires the foundations of an informal as well as formal institutional system. 
Moreover, as cultures vary so there will be many forms of market economy ‘and many 
species of capitalism’ (Gray 1998, 155). This cultural-institutional or contextual 
dimension, which finds fruition in the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature, is highly 
germane to the comparative institutional perspective developed later in the paper (Hall 
and Soskice 2001).  
In section 2 the paper considers the issues that arise from trying to rebalance the NI 
economy. We then in section 3 consider to what extent the Nordic countries are alike. 
This is followed in section 4 by a consideration of how far the Nordic economies have 
changed in recent decades. Then in section 5 we consider how far any Nordic model 
could in fact be transferable. As part of that discussion we probe the issue of the 
institutional economics of devolution and make some observations regarding fiscal 
decentralisation in the context of the UK.  And we conclude with section 6.  The evidence 
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presented in this paper indicates that Northern Irish economic problems arise less from 
the public sector being too big and more that the private sector has been too weak; that NI 
has not yet developed a sufficiently large and thriving exporting and externally trading 
private sector. In short, NI has a relatively large public sector in part to compensate for a 
legacy of industrial decline and political instability. The paper concludes that comparative 
institutional analysis indicates that the parallels between the large public sectors of the 
Nordics and NI should not be overdrawn.  
 
2. Rebalancing and the NI economy  
Rebalancing in the NI case, however it is defined, did not automatically follow the 
introduction of devolution (HM Treasury 2011; Murtagh and Shirlow 2012). Claims that 
public sector dependence has damaged the NI economy are longstanding and they predate 
the introduction of the modern devolved political institutions. Gibson (1996) argued that 
one consequence of the relatively large public sector was that wage and benefit levels were 
pushed above those which would have been consistent with a full employment equilibrium.8 
Yet whatever the merits of the ‘crowding out’ thesis as providing a diagnosis of long-
run British economic performance, it cannot convincingly explain either the Nordic or 
Northern Irish experiences.9 The need to rebalance the NI economy on a variety of measures 
discussed in Figure 1 has been debated within official documents. HM Treasury in 
Rebalancing the Northern Ireland Economy explicitly linked the issue of rebalancing to the 
economic legacy of the Troubles (HM Treasury 2011).  The opening paragraph of the report 
argued that violence had deterred private sector foreign investment, and that ‘although 
helpful, peace has not in itself been sufficient to raise Northern Ireland prosperity to the UK 
average or even to the UK average excluding South East England’ (HM Treasury 2011). 
The Treasury’s analysis then equated any move towards creating a relatively smaller public 
sector in the NI context with a reduced corporation tax rate encouraging increased inward 
investment.  
However, there are other UK regions, notably Wales and the North East of England 
with relatively high percentages of public spending compared to regional GVA; about 65%. 
This is suggestive that NI’s position is partly the outcome of relative economic 
performance, relatively high rates of unemployment and relatively low rates of income per 
head, but partly it is also the outcome of relatively recent history. The HMT diagnosis 
notably presents the economic malaise of NI as being based on a syndrome unique to the 
region rather than representing a more general problem associated with the UK’s (or indeed 
Europe’s) peripheral and/or post-industrial regions. 
On reflection, NI has long exhibited three classes of economic problem; none of these 
three classes of problem can be blamed plausibly on an excessively large public sector 
(Brownlow 2013; 2015). A first category of problems are the economic weaknesses that it 
has shared with Britain. Failures of macroeconomic policy can be placed in this category 
(Crafts 1995; 2012). A second category of weaknesses has involved magnified versions of 
weaknesses found in the rest of the UK such as weaknesses in training, limited management 
capabilities and an underdeveloped innovation system (Crafts 1995; Hitchens and Birnie 
1994; Birnie and Hitchens 1999; Brownlow 2013). A third source of malaise have been 
those unique to the region’s circumstances (Hitchens and Birnie 1994; Birnie and Hitchens 
1999; Brownlow 2012).10 While acknowledging the way that a governmental ‘regional 
Keynesian’ policy response - initially to mitigate civil unrest and then to support a peace 
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process - tended to boost public expenditure, it is still the case that the Treasury’s analysis 
of rebalancing tended to overstate the importance of this third category.11 Therefore, the 
economic challenges facing NI are not entirely attributable to region-specific sources; 
instead they relate in large part to the UK’s unbalanced spatial and structural economics 
(Pike et al 2012; Tomlinson 2012, 2014).  
Private sector-led growth in the UK has become concentrated in London and the South 
East (Pike et al 2012). The market sector has thus become geographically concentrated in 
the English South East. In contrast, the poorer northern and western regions (a category in 
which we can place NI) have been stabilised only by the growth of nonmarket services 
being used to replace lost manufacturing output and employment (Pike et al 2012, pp.19-20; 
Tomlinson 2014). The stabilisation of fragile regional economies by increasing their 
dependence on public sector employment has created ‘sheltered’ regional economics across 
Europe (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi 2007).  The need to rebalance the NI economy reflects 
the fact that the region (like many others in Europe) exhibits a wider issue of a weak, de-
globalised private sector giving rise to a dependence on the public sector.  
A simple Bacon and Eltis ‘crowding out’ diagnosis, a diagnosis that was after all 
developed to explain macroeconomic rather than regional economic performance,  therefore 
is misleading in the context of the NI economy for at least three reasons. Firstly, levels of 
public expenditure, both per capita and as a percentage of regional GDP, have increased to a 
relatively high levels.12 To the extent that much of that government spending is funded by a 
fiscal transfer from the rest of the UK this may have implied a higher level of demand in the 
regional economy and hence higher private sector output.  The simple percentage of public 
spending relative to regional GVA also does not allow for the extent to which parts of the 
NI private sector are also, indirectly, dependent on public expenditure (a mechanism that the 
simple ‘crowding out’ mechanism tends to ignore). There could in fact be a negative and 
multiplied effect throughout the private sector if public expenditure were reduced. The 
weakness of the private sector, which increases the region’s economic reliance on public 
sector activity, reflects the fact that, unlike the Nordics, the region has exhibited 
longstanding structural weakness reflecting in part nationwide problems.  
Secondly, the empirical evidence on government R&D expenditures does not tend to 
support the ‘crowding out’ thesis. For a region like NI that has long lagged in terms of 
R&D, a narrow focus on reducing public expenditure is unlikely to unleash enterprise, but a 
more careful targeting of spending to assist innovation  in the private sector might help 
(Northern Ireland Economic Council 1999). The historical record of UK industrial policy 
suggests that the dangers associated with government failure (however defined) are very 
real (Shackleton and Zuluaga, 2016).  
Evidence from NI service firms suggests that policy should aim to foster extra-regional 
consumers and innovation will be boosted if exports are the focus of policy (Love, Roper 
and Hewitt-Dundas 2010).  Thirdly, in the NI case discussing the economy in terms of a 
clear public-private divide obscures the fact that a substantially publically funded 
community and voluntary sector exists; that social enterprises, particularly in disadvantaged 
urban communities, have important roles to play (Murtagh and Shirlow 2012). 
 
3. Nordics  
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Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark are all small, open economies (each with 
populations of about 5m although Sweden is rather larger at about 10m). They have some 
cultural similarities which is unsurprising given the various ways in which these nations 
were joined together in a variety of political unions over the last three or four centuries. 
At the same time, it is important not to exaggerate how far they are homogenous. For 
example, one of the four countries, Finland, is a Eurozone members and the other three 
are not, one is not in the European Union (Norway) and some approaches to policy differ. 
But have the Nordics really been so successful in economic terms? Table 1 suggests they 
have if the emphasis is on relative living standards and the employment rate (i.e. 
percentage of the working age population actually in work) although consideration of 
recent unemployment rates is more ambiguous.  As Table 2 indicates, NI and the Nordics 
may not have shared outcomes in terms of living standards, but they have both developed 
large public sectors.13 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Throughout the twentieth century the four Nordic countries also maintained 
consistently democratic, parliamentary institutions with a strong and growing 
representation of women, alongside relatively egalitarian outcomes with respect to, say, 
educational performance and distribution of income. As noted in Table 3, according to the 
standard statistical measure of the extent of equality in incomes the Gini coefficient, the 
Nordics have been consistently some of the most equal of the OECD countries.14 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Economists emphasise a potential trade-off between economic efficiency (and 
competitiveness) on the one hand and equality on the other (Okun 1975). Different 
economists have different normative views of the implications of such a trade-off: 
Hayek’s writings for instance can be interpreted as valuing the pursuit of efficiency over 
equity. In contrast, Stiglitz’s more recent work indicates that greater equity may be 
necessary for dynamic efficiency as embodied in innovation (Stiglitz 2014). His argument 
appears to have strong support from Nordic empirical evidence. Significantly, the Nordics 
have scored well on both equality/quality of life measures as well, though probably to a 
lesser extent, on those relating to competitiveness. This is demonstrated in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Given all this, it is unsurprising that admiring glances at the Scandinavian countries 
started many years ago. In the 1930s some British and American commentators thought 
that Sweden had perfected a rather attractive “middle way” between instable capitalist 
systems characterised by mass unemployment and planned economies characterised by 
despotism although this Swedish variant of “Keynesianism” may have been better 
developed in theory than in practice until well after the Second World War.15   
 
4. Change within the Nordics 
A key shared characteristic of the Nordics is not that they escaped crisis: it is that they 
were more resilient. Challenges during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s produced resolute 
reform programmes, in Sweden this has involved cutting public expenditure, and now these 
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countries are enjoying favourable outcomes. The NI economy and policy system have 
probably not been good at rising to challenges. It might be suggested that the 2010 
Spending Review and subsequent Executive Budget and Programme for Government for 
2011-15 were missed opportunities. Notwithstanding the global downturn, the Nordics were 
relatively successful in containing the rise in unemployment. This, obviously, is an 
attractive outcome. Importantly, it may be less that the Nordics have avoided crises and 
more that either they had their own crisis somewhat earlier than the rest of Europe or that 
they handled the response to the recent banking crisis better. Norway had to cope with a 
property and credit boom in the 1980s. In Finland unemployment rose to 20% following the 
loss of the traditionally very important export market in the former Soviet Union. Various 
forms of policy discipline were applied. For example, central banks in Sweden and Norway 
were amongst the first to move towards tough inflation targets. Finland became a member 
of the Eurozone.  
The Nordics have also adopted a range of budget and budget deficit rules. Denmark has 
a renowned system of labour market “flexicurity”. However, Denmark’s labour market 
performance was not always favourable. In the 1970s there was considerable stagflation. It 
was only later that wage setters (e.g. the unions) began to practice wage moderation. 
Employees can now expect to have to move around as market conditions change and also to 
re-train if necessary. The flip side of this social contract is that they will be protected and 
the state will pay for the re-training etc. In other words, welfare benefits are high, which 
maintains equity, but employers still operate in a system geared to efficiency as they have 
strong rights to hire and fire (Boeri, Galasso and Conde-Ruiz 2012; World Bank 2012).16  
Various commentators have argued for a Danish flexicurity system in UK, as it is suggested 
that it tends to promote a high-skilled, high-productivity and high-wage labour market. 
Given that NI has long had particular problems in this regard, so it might appear particularly 
attractive to policymakers at Stormont (Hutton 1994; Birnie and Hitchens 1999). A 
jurisdiction can of course choose to have active labour market policies similar to Denmark 
provided it is prepared to pay for them; in 2008 Denmark spent the equivalent of 2.6% of its 
GDP on active labour market policies compared to an OECD average rate of 1.4% (World 
Bank 2012, 298).  
As noted in Section 2, consideration of rebalancing the NI economy often starts by 
looking at the size of public spending relative to the region’s GVA or GDP. How do the 
Nordics perform in that regard? Here, the position is mixed but to the extent that the 
Scandinavian public sectors have got leaner this probably means that it is too simplistic to 
treat the Nordic example as a “get out of fail free card” for NI’s heavy dependence on the 
public sector. In Sweden, for example, state spending relative to GDP peaked at 67% in 
1993. A significant fiscal retrenchment then followed. Since then it is notable that state 
spending has declined relative to national income and in the mid 2010s stood at about 49% 
(in other words, not dissimilar to the UK national average). It is also worth pointing out that 
the headline rate of corporation tax in Sweden at 22% is similar to that of the UK (including 
NI). So, there may be a case, Aslund argues to view Sweden as, “...a new conservative 
model” (The Economist 2013). At the same time, the top marginal tax rate in Sweden was 
still 57% (though down from 84% in 1983). Denmark has moved in the other direction, 
public spending relative to GDP increasing from 51% in 2007 to 58% in 2013. Norway’s 
figure remained at 52% (about one-third of public revenues come from North Sea oil 
receipts).  
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5. How Transferable is the Nordic Model? Some Observations Regarding 
Devolution Economics  
 
Rodrik’s 1998 paper has important implications for observing a small open economy 
such as Northern Ireland in a Nordic mirror (Rodrik 1998). Rodrik’s comparative 
institutional analysis thus helps shed further light on the possible transferability of the 
Nordic model. Rodrik observed the robust statistical coexistence of vibrant trading 
performance in small highly, open European economies, such as the Nordics, with some 
of the world’s highest shares of government spending in national income. Rodrik argued 
that a compensation hypothesis explained the empirical findings (Rodrik 1998; Hardiman, 
Murphy and Burke 2008). Big government and high levels of openness, according to 
Rodrik, coexisted because societies demanded (and received) an expanded government 
role as the insurance ‘premium’ required for accepting a larger exposure to external 
trading risk. As he noted, ‘government spending appears to provide social insurance in 
economies subject to external shocks’ (Rodrik 1998, 998). Rodrik’s compensation 
hypothesis implies that the inequities that can arise from an export-led pursuit of growth 
requires an institutional ‘safety net’. Rodrik of course ignored the observation that some 
of this ‘insurance’ could be provided by the private or voluntary sector. 
Rodrik’s compensation hypothesis has proven influential within the applied 
economics and public finance literatures as well as inspiring work within political science 
(Anderson 2012; Boeri, Galasso and Conde-Ruiz 2012; Hardiman, Murphy and Burke 
2008). Tomlinson’s analysis of the long-run development of the Scottish economy also 
makes use of Rodrik’s compensation hypothesis. Tomlinson’s discussion is most germane 
to our discussion as it has relevance to another devolved region of the UK with an 
industrial legacy of shipbuilding and textiles that gave way to a process of de-
globalisation based on an increased reliance on public sector employment (Tomlinson 
2012, 2014). Tomlinson observes, with particular resonance to those search for an 
‘economic dividend’ from devolution, that devolution reinforces de-globalisation.17 With 
the creation of devolved political institutions, decisions made about public expenditure 
within the Scottish Parliament, based on constraints imposed from London, increasingly 
matter more than before (Tomlinson 2014, 176). This paper indicates that, irrespective of 
the political uncertainties that exist, what is true for Edinburgh, also holds for Belfast. 
Furthermore, the gap between the devolution of expenditure and taxation is one only 
starting to narrow.   
Earlier in the paper it was suggested that the institutional-cultural component is 
germane to discussing the Nordic model and the feasibility of transplanting it. The four 
Nordic countries are now politically independent of each other. Incidentally, three are in 
the EU and one (Norway) outside and one in the euro and three outside (Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway). They do retain many cultural similarities. They have been 
ethnically relatively homogenous, at least until the arrival of migrants and asylum seekers 
in recent years, are internationally orientated including being strongly connected into the 
English-speaking world, and have a sort of post-Lutheran communitarianism (The 
Economist 2013).18 It is not straightforward to compare and contrast social values and 
attitudes across countries. However, one attempt, the World Values Survey 1991-2001 
suggests the Nordics combine an attachment to a strong state with radical individualism, 
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i.e. a strong emphasis on individual autonomy and equality with the state seen as an 
instrument which helps achieve such outcomes (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
By these standards, NI looks rather different, being insular, monolingual and still 
marred by many post-conflict divisions. A more positive readings of NI’s position, if one 
values these things, as also indicated in Inglehart and Welzel (2005), is that NI people 
place relatively high dependence on family and traditional values. The Nordics economies 
do appear unusual, e.g. as indicated by surveys such as Eurobarometer, because they 
combine relatively high attachment to radical individualism with a high degree of trust in 
government and public institutions.  
The four Nordics are often regarded as interesting laboratories in public policy. As 
places, in fact, where evidence based policy making is actually done. Interestingly for 
those social scientists interested in policy transfer, the London coalition government has 
shown some willingness to look to Nordic policy models, e.g. Swedish free schools. 
Perhaps the lesson for NI is that it is possible to have sophisticated policy making. 
However, to the extent that such sophistication brings a resource requirement, the 
challenge then would be is the Executive/Assembly willing to pay for that, indeed, given 
its existing (limited) powers of fiscal variation could it raise such resources?  
There is room to debate just how socialist/social democratic social welfare, 
educational and other policies have been in the Nordics. But for sure such policy making 
has taken place alongside a highly competitive market orientated core in each Nordic 
economy. Equity has been reconciled with efficiency in a way that tends to confirm 
Rodrik’s thesis (Rodrik 1998; Tomlinson 2014). One Danish pharma firm, for example, 
produces about one half of the world’s insulin. In 2010 the enterprise department (DETI) 
commissioned studies as to how the innovation systems in Sweden and Finland worked 
(Oxford Economics 2011). One possible indication of the success of the approach taken 
in the Nordics is that to a much greater extent than the UK (including NI) they have 
maintained a relatively buoyant manufacturing sector. This suggests success in terms of 
being competitive in global markets. Table 5 illustrates some revealing comparative data: 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
Not only do the Nordics tend to have larger manufacturing sectors in proportional 
terms but they invest and export more (the Nordic/UK comparison is subject to the caveat 
that small economies, generally, have higher exports to GDP ratios). They also invest 
more, in proportional terms, on business R&D and have had much more buoyant 
manufacturing output growth over the last two decades. In placing such emphasis on the 
proportional scale of manufacturing we are not intending to make the argument 
“manufacturing good, service sectors bad”. Moreover, as Scottish evidence indicates, it is 
questionable if calls to ‘reindustrialise’ UK regions would adequately address the 
important employment implications of such an aim (Tomlinson 2014, 177; Shackleton 
and Zuluaga, 2016). Some services, e.g. ICT, banking and finance, legal, business, 
creative, architectural and civil engineering and tourism, do export (PwC 2013). 
However, the total size of the global market in traded services remains much smaller than 
that for manufactured goods.  
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Whilst the data are incomplete, NI’s total service exports are likely to be much be 
much smaller than manufacturing exports. Interestingly and notwithstanding the small 
size of each of the Nordics, their national governments have also been able to stand aside 
from protectionist policies which attempt to create so-called national champions. For 
example, in recent years the Stockholm government refused to bail out Saab and it 
allowed a Chinese take-over of Volvo. The recent struggles of Nokia illustrate the point 
which we made earlier that all economic models are provisional and somewhat fragile; 
today’s economic success can become tomorrow’s failure. Incidentally, Nokia in 2000 
represented about 4% of the entire GDP of Finland. Translated into NI terms that would 
be equivalent to about £1.2bn or about twice the local sales of Bombardier.  
There are some world competitive firms present within the NI region. The problem is 
there are too few of them. The most recent survey suggests that NI’s largest 
manufacturing employers (250 or more employees) account for around 60 per cent of all 
exports (ex-UK) (Department of Finance and Personnel, 2013). The study for DETI of 
successful, small economies noted how a cross-sectoral priority on innovation was a 
stand-out feature of Finland’s economic achievement (Oxford Economics 2011). Much 
more important than any financial incentives to business innovation activity was the fact 
that public sector, universities and industries collaborate in a seamless way.19 NI and 
Sweden et al each have relatively large public sectors but this ‘headline’ similarity may 
be deceptive in terms of economic outcomes and context –such a finding echoes Hayek’s 
analysis. 
In practice, there is a much large market/client focus within the Nordics. In Denmark 
and Norway private firms run some hospitals. Vouchers are used to produce a market 
amongst schools in Sweden and Denmark. Finland, admittedly, combines extremely 
impressive school results along with what we might call a state financed comprehensive 
system; at the same time, a sharp divide between academic and vocational education 
occurs at age 16 and Finnish teachers, whilst comparatively poorly paid by UK standards 
have been allowed much greater freedom from state regulation and interference.  
In the Nordics, government tends to be highly accessible, e.g. strong use of e-
government. Much of spending and taxation is pushed down to the local government 
level. Perhaps even more importantly, it is generally trusted; “The state is popular not 
because it is big but because it works” (The Economist 2013). It is also worth 
emphasising, again, how much and how well the state and private sectors collaborate. 
Yes, but only to a limited extent, it will be hard work to process the transfer and it will 
certainly take some time. For example, NI does not enjoy the full range of cultural values 
which underpin the Nordic model. The Executive in NI could adopt a much more Nordic 
evidence-based approach to policy making. Similarly, it could try to turn crisis into an 
opportunity although previous experience suggests little appetite for this. Whilst the 
Nordics have been successful in creating and maintaining very competitive private sectors 
this has remained the elusive goal for NI economic policy for several decades now.  
Of course one need not look to the Nordics for policy transfer. Given the economic 
success of NI’s southern neighbour (a success that has been in part attributed to lower 
corporate taxation) there have been calls, which can be traced back to the 1990s, to 
reduce the rate of Corporation Tax in NI relative to GB (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2011). 
So advocates of this policy take the distinctly non-Hayekian line that such tax reduction 
will act as a “silver bullet” that will rectify NI’s economic weaknesses. The intellectual 
merits or otherwise of this proposal could justify a paper in their own right and indeed 
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have already been much debated by academic, business and policy economists 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2011; Budd, 2016; Birnie and Brownlow, 2017). It is suffice 
to note that substantial political and business lobbying has gone into promoting the policy 
as a “silver bullet”. The comments here, rather than arguing over the plausibility of the 
claim that lower taxation in isolation will create a step improvement in the NI economy, 
will instead merely note the institutional or legal complexities. 
Devolving any tax rate varying power must satisfy the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) regarding the “Azores case”. The origins of this case were that in 1999 the 
Government of the Autonomous Region of the Azores adopted rules to reduce tax rates in 
the Azores relative to the rest of Portugal. The European Commission initiated a formal 
investigation because it was thought that such a rule violated state aid rules. The case was 
considered by the Constitutional Court of the ECJ. The ECJ ruled that the Azores did 
breach selective aid rules as reduced tax revenues were offset by mechanism that 
involved a budgetary transfer from the Portuguese government. The court held that the 
European Commission was correct to classify the Azores financial arrangements as 
selective and incompatible aid.  
Of relevance to tax devolution in NI, the ECJ ruling sets out the three criteria 
(institutional autonomy, procedural autonomy and fiscal autonomy) which need to be met 
for regional variation in in direct taxation not to involve State Aid. Meeting all three 
criteria is required if a proposed tax devolution measure is to be compliant with EU law. 
The Treasury decided that NI met the first two of these conditions. However, to satisfy 
the fiscal autonomy condition, the NI Executive would need to bear the full fiscal 
consequences of changes in tax revenues resulting from a new (lower) NI corporation tax 
rate. In practical terms the Treasury required that Northern Ireland’s block grant would be 
adjusted to reflect the fiscal costs of a reduced rate of Corporation Tax. Despite Brexit, 
and its associated legal changes, it is plausible to suggest that this fiscal implication will 
hold if CT is ever devolved.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The policy diagnoses of this paper are partly Hayekian, in the sense that following the 
arguments in Constitution of Liberty, and elsewhere, it has been more concerned with 
studying if and how the NI economy can be ‘nudged’ onto a more competitive (‘Nordic’) 
path, or if and how policies can be transferred, rather than focusing on a simple ‘crowding 
out’ analysis of governmental role in the economy. However, Hayek’s analysis does not 
take us as far in the comparative institutional-cultural direction as we would wish. As 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2014) have demonstrated, institutional factors are crucial to 
explaining the fate of Swedish (and thus by extension, Nordic) economic performance. The 
paper therefore, while accepting Hayek’s perceptive insight on the relative economic 
importance of the structure and volume of government, takes the analysis more along 
Rodrik’s comparative institutional line of argument.  
The Nordic countries have managed to combine relatively big states and successful 
economies. This shines an interesting light on recent debates about rebalancing the NI 
economy. At the same time, it cannot simply be assumed that because Denmark, Finland, 
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Norway and Sweden manage to combine a large state sector with a vibrant economy that the 
same analysis should hold for NI. The Nordics have organised both their public and private 
sectors such that the large measured share of public sector activity is sustainable. The 
Nordics have managed to successfully balance equity and efficiency concerns. This is the 
challenge which NI has hitherto struggled with. At a superficial level, NI appears like the 
Nordics to have a performance culture in the public sector but in practice successful 
implementation of this has remained elusive. Some Nordic lessons are germane for NI. 
However, transplanting policies that emerged from within the Nordic cultural-institutional 
system may not be possible in the very different Northern Irish situation.  
Rodrik’s analysis indicates that what sets NI apart is not so much a large government 
sector, which as he notes lots of successful small open economies possess, instead what 
really sets NI apart is that a large public sector share does not correspond with a thriving, 
diverse export sector. In this regard, the failure to reverse de-globalisation and create a 
diversified, open economy in NI looks similar to the economic issues facing Scotland 
(Tomlinson 2012, 2014). Rebalancing is thus something desirable if it is generated by a 
transformation in regional competitiveness, but Rodrik’s analysis implies that the standard 
idea, implicit in much of the rebalancing discussion, of a trade-off between more rapid 
growth (an efficiency measure) and higher levels of social protection (an equity measure) 
may be unhelpful (Tomlinson 2014, 175). As Tomlinson notes, it may actually be the case 
that ‘higher levels of security remove resistance to growth-enhancing changes’ (Tomlinson 
2014, 175).   
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Figure 1: Options as to how to measure the rebalancing of the NI economy 
Aspect of rebalancing Options 
 Public spending  Absolute amount, real terms or cash 
terms?, OR as a percentage of total 
GVA? 
 Public sector employment  Absolute number OR as a percentage 
of total employment? 
 Timescale of adjustment  Long term OR short term? 
 Size of the fiscal transfer, or subvention, from 
HM Treasury to the Executive to cover the 
excess of public spending compared to tax 
receipts in NI20  
 Is reduction in the transfer part of 
rebalancing OR not? 
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Table 1: Relative living standards and labour market performance in the Nordics 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden UK NI 
GDP per head 
(PPP)2016 EU 
average=100 
125 109 149 124 108 79(2015) 
Unemployment 
rate% (ILO 
definition) July 
2017 
5.4 8.8 4.1 7.1 4.4 (May) 4.7 (July-
August) 
Employment 
rate% (ILO 
and Eurostat 
definition) 16-
64 year 
old(Jan.-
Mar.2013) 
72.0 68.5(Oct.-
Dec. 2012) 
75.4(2010) 72.9 71.4 66.7 
Note on sources: GDP comparisons using purchasing power parities. An NI/UK comparison for 2015, 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) 15 December 2016, “Regional GVA (Income Approach)”, Statistical 
Bulletin, ONS, Newport, is linked to the EU comparisons in Eurostat (1 June 2017). Unemployment rates 
comparisons use a comparable ILO based definition in Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 
(NISRA) October 2017, Labour Market Report, NISRA, Belfast and ILO. Employment rate using 
comparable ILO definitions for the working age population (defined as 15 to 64), from Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA website), www.detini.gov.uk/Ifs_2.11_mm13.xls 
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Table 2 : Relative size of public sector employment in the Nordic countries (all employment figures in 
‘000s) 
 Denmark 
2005 
Finland 
2005 
Norway2005 Sweden2005 UK2005 UK2011 NI2011 
PSE 928.4 654.0 831.6 1239.8 6107.0 6056 222 
L 2732.8 2421.0 2289.0 4263.0 28166.0 29115.4 781.7 
PSE%ofL 34.0 27.0 36.3 29.1 21.6 20.8 28.4 
PSE: Total public sector employment (including public enterprises and agencies and organisations which 
are mainly publicly funded). 
L: Total number in employment in entire economy. 
Note on sources: Comparisons for 2005 based on comparable definition of public sector employment and total 
employment, from International Labour Organisation (ILO) statistics (ILO website 
http://laborsta.ilo.orgSTP/guest) except Finland where there was a narrower definition of public sector 
excluding some public enterprises and also using a national definition of total employment in the case of 
Denmark. The UK and NI data for 2011 are not necessarily on an entirely comparable basis to the earlier ILO 
comparisons, the definition of public sector includes those banks subject to public support after 2008; from 
Office for National Statistics 12 September 2012, “Public sector employment, Q2 2012”, Statistical Bulletin, 
ONS, Newport. It was not possible to breakdown public sector employment by type of activity. 
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Table 3: Income (after tax and benefits) inequality in the Nordics compared to the UK, 2010 (Gini 
coefficients, closer to zero equals more equal, closer to one equals more unequal) 
Country/region Gini coefficient 
Norway 0.25 
Denmark 0.25 
Finland 0.26 
Sweden 0.27 
Scotland 0.30 
Northern Ireland Number not disclosed but indicated as slightly less 
than Scotland21 
UK 0.34 
Source: OECD data. Scotland from Scottish Government November 2013, op.cit. Northern Ireland from 
Department for Enterprise, Trade and Investment March 2012, Economic Strategy Rebuilding and 
Rebalancing the Economy: An Evidence Base, Paper to support Executive Economic Strategy, accessed 
from DETI website, http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/nies-evidence-base-slides-march-2012.pdf, 
accessed 9 December 2013. 
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Table 4: Quality of life/equality indicators and competitiveness measures in the Nordics compared to 
the UK 
 Quality of life/equality 
indicators 
Competitiveness measures (country ranking, 1= best) 
Country UN HDI 
ranking 
(2012)* 
Gini 
coefficient 
(2010) 
Ease of doing 
business 
(2014)** 
IMD 
competitiveness 
(2013)*** 
WEF 
competitiveness 
(2012-13)**** 
Denmark 15 0.252 5 12 12 
Finland 21 0.26 12 20 3 
Norway 1 0.249 9 6 15 
Sweden 7 0.269 14 4 4 
UK 26 0.341 10 18 8 
NI n.a. c.0.3 n.a. n.a. 42 
Note: *Human Development Index; weighted average of ranking by GDP (purchasing power parity) per 
head, educational provision and life expectancy. 
**http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2014 
***http://www.imd.org/wcc/news-wcy-ranking/ 
****SQW/Economic Advisory Group/Cambridge Econometrics June 2013, Competitiveness Index for 
Northern Ireland, EAG, Belfast. 
Source: Scottish Government November 2013 
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Table 5: The performance of the Nordics’ performance compared to the UK in terms of 
various indicators of business competitiveness, 2011 
 Manufacturing 
output as % of 
total GVA 
Business 
investment as 
% of GDP 
Exports as % 
of GDP 
Business 
R&D as % 
of GDP 
Change in 
manufacturing 
GVA 1990-
2011 
(constant 
prices) 
Denmark 10.9 10.3 53.8 2.1 11.2 
Finland 17.3 9.9 40.7 2.7 105.8 
Sweden 16.8 11.9 49.9 2.3 154.7 
UK 10.8 8.2 32.5 1.3 2.4 
NI 13 n.a. 22 (2013) 1.4 8.6* 
Note:*Estimated using the relationship which existed between nominal GVA growth in NI and the 
UK during 1997-2001. 
Source: UNCTAD,Eurostat and OECD quoted in Scottish Government November 2013, op.cit. NI 
from ONS (and UK business R&D rate), NI export rate from NISRA 14 August 2017,Broad 
Economy Sales and Export Statistics, NISRA, Belfast and NISRA 7 August 2017, Economics 
Accounting Project, NISRA, Belfast . 
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1 Furthermore, an earlier study suggested that Bacon and Eltis did not provide a persuasive formulation of labour 
shortage. During the 1970s the private sector jobs lost were predominately held by male whereas the public 
sector jobs created were far more likely to be (often part time) females  (Stafford, 1981, pp.50-51). 
2 At the time of writing (November 2017) there is not a functioning Northern Ireland Executive or Assembly. 
Yet regardless of whatever political situation emerges, it would be our contention that any genuine attempt at 
improving regional economic performance should draw on the insights provided here. For more information on 
the costs and benefits of decentralising taxation in the Northern Irish case see (Budd, 2016; Birnie and 
Brownlow, 2017). For a discussion of the institutional economics applied to the devolution project in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland see (Brownlow, 2017). 
3 Although it is often counted as a member of the Nordic club, we have excluded Iceland from our 
consideration. This is partly because Iceland’s population is much smaller than that of the other four countries 
and smaller even than NI. Its population of 300,000 is similar to that of the city of Belfast. Iceland had a very 
favourable economic performance until the downturn in 2008 followed by an extremely sharp recession; both 
driven in part by a financial sector which was very large compared to domestic GDP. 
4 Hayek certainly cannot be claimed to be an ideological advocate for economic interventionism. Famously, 
during the calculation debate Hayek demonstrated the epistemic impossibilities of successful socialist economic 
planning (Butler 1983; Gray 1998, 146-61). However, even one of his most perceptive critics acknowledges that 
Hayek’s social scientific writings must be distinguished from his more ideological writings (Gamble 1996). 
5 Hayek rejected passive government or laissez faire, which he equated with non-intervention, as he thought it 
provided an inadequate criterion for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate interventions (Hayek 
1960, 231; Miller 2010, 138).As Miller summarises Hayek’s argument in this regard, ‘an active government that 
assists the spontaneous forces of the market is preferable to a less active one that does the wrong things’ (Miller 
2010, 138). 
6 For instance, Hayek argued that correcting informational problems as well as providing monetary stability 
were areas that government could usefully support economic activity (Hayek 1960, 223). Some areas of health 
and safety legislation were also placed in this category (Hayek 1960, 225). Hayek likewise opposed price 
regulation because it would have to be discretionary and arbitrary rather than grounded in rules (Hayek 1960, 
228).  
8  Another argument was part of public spending was used to compensate for and in effect fossilise inefficiency 
in the production side of the economy and especially manufacturing (Hitchens, Wagner and Birnie 1990). Crafts 
(1995), in a pioneering empirical piece, demonstrated that the X-inefficiency, which a high level of public 
spending encouraged, was an important component in explaining why NI’s trend rate of economic growth 
between 1945 and 1973 was less than that which would otherwise have been expected. 
9   It should be clear to the interested reader that the Eltis and Bacon model was originally devised to explain 
macroeconomic rather that regional problems. A referee suggested that public projects pay better than private 
ones, so government contracts could in principle ‘crowd out’ resources that otherwise dedicated to private 
activities, Hence a decline of firms dependent upon public contracts would lead capital to reallocate rewards 
towards a more private sector-based economy. While a theoretically interesting argument it is difficult to see 
how this could be tested in the NI case: we don’t have otherwise identical contracts to compare and the  fact that 
the economy is dominated by privately owned family firms means that we are limited the information we have 
concerning capital allocation.    
10 The negative economic effects of peripheral location (particularly in its ‘softer’ form) could be placed in this 
category. Soft peripherality is claimed to be associated with cumulative causation as initial disadvantage can 
breed long-term disadvantage (Birnie and Hitchens 1999). Likewise, during the Troubles the economic 
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implications of civil unrest further damaged an already fragile regional economy. It is important to note that that 
economy was already underperforming prior to the outbreak of violence (Rowthorn 1981; Brownlow 2012; 
2013). 
11 The apex of state planning was the publication in 1976 of the Quigley Report which advocated the pursuit of a 
regional industrial policy led by civil servants involving a high degree of state intervention aimed at industrial 
development (Quigley 1976). 
12 In 2011 NI regional output or gross value added (GVA) totalled £29.4bn. In the same year total public 
spending in NI (including NI’s share of certain UK-wide expenditures) was about £22.4bn, i.e. equivalent to 
about three-quarters of the total output of the region. 
13 A note of caution at this point, while the long-run performance of the Nordics have been impressive, it is 
noteworthy that while between 2008 and 2014, Sweden, Norway and Denmark all recovered from the global 
financial crisis, albeit with differing degrees of success, Finland remained mired in recession with its economy 
in 2014 remaining around 6% lower than its 2008 level. Country-specific factors, such as its greater economic 
exposure to Russia and its policymaker’s more serious pursuit of austere macroeconomic policies, have been 
invoked to explain why Finland’s economic performance has diverged from the rest of the Nordics (Hinds and 
Hollingsworth, 2014).  
14 Where a value of zero indicates absolute equality and a value of one extreme inequality. 
15 See, for example, Childs (1947).     
16 Moreover, of relevance to the importance of Rodrik’s thesis, there is some empirical evidence linking 
flexicurity to his finding that social insurance may be greater in countries more exposed to international 
competition (Boeri, Galasso and Conde-Ruiz, 2012, 703). 
17 This may have been because the devolved administrations in the UK have so far been concerned mainly with 
making decisions about spending without a corresponding responsibility to make a decision about how such 
spending is funded. Policies relating to distributional matters have arguably been given priority relative to those 
which might promote economic growth. In other words, politicians within devolved settings are particularly 
susceptible to lobbying that leads to higher public expenditure. Such a finding has echoes in those who have 
previously written about the economic dividend of devolution (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). 
18 It is noted that the employment rate amongst native born Swedes is 84% compared to 51% amongst non-
Europeans in Sweden. By implication, the Nordics are not immune to some of the social problems felt 
elsewhere. 
19 Such collaboration being directed at the highest political level; the Research Innovation Council is chaired by 
the Prime Minister. There is an active innovation promotion agency; Tekes. Alongside this there is a strong 
publicly funded research body, the VTT, which, significantly, sits outside of the universities and also charges 
businesses for its services.  
20 (Department of Finance and Personnel, 2012). According to that source the transfer in 2010-11 was about 
£10bn. 
21 One earlier study using the Family Expenditure Survey data  indicated a Gini coefficient  of 0.34 for 
disposable income in NI in 2001/2 (V.Gribben December 2002, Evaluation of the New TSN: Gini Coefficient 
Analysis, OFM DFM Equality Directorate Research Branch, Belfast, accessed from 
http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/gini.pdf, [9 December 2013]. An even earlier study indicated that the Gini 
coefficients for NI and GB were almost identical in the 1980s albeit comparison was difficult because the graph 
lines of the cumulative % of income earned by decile (“the Lorenz curves”) for NI and GB crossed over; See 
(McGregor and Borooah 1991).  
